With the rapid development of cloud storage, more and more resource-constraint data owners can employ cloud storage services to reduce the heavy local storage overhead. However, the local data owners lose the direct control over their data, and all the operations over the outsourced data, such as data transfer and deletion, will be executed by the remote cloud server. As a result, the data transfer and deletion have become two security issues because the selfish remote cloud server might not honestly execute these operations for economic benefits. In this article, we design a scheme that aims to make the data transfer and the transferred data deletion operations more transparent and publicly verifiable. Our proposed scheme is based on vector commitment (VC), which is used to deal with the problem of public verification during the data transfer and deletion. More specifically, our new scheme can provide the data owner with the ability to verify the data transfer and deletion results. In addition, by using the advantages of VC, our proposed scheme does not require any trusted third party. Finally, we prove that the proposed scheme not only can reach the expected security goals but also can satisfy the efficiency and practicality.
Introduction
Cloud computing, an emerging and promising computing paradigm, was first put forward by Google. 1 Cloud computing can connect a large number of computing resources, network bandwidths, and storage spaces together via the Internet. 2, 3 Using these tremendous resources, the cloud service provider is able to provide on-demand self-service for the tenants conveniently and ubiquitously, for example, outsourcing service, [4] [5] [6] identity authentication, 7 cloud storage service, and data search. [8] [9] [10] In the cloud storage service paradigm, the cloud storage service provider can offer resourceconstraint data owners boundless storage resources and network resources. Thanks to a number of irresistible advantages, the cloud storage service has been widely applied in daily life and work. In order to save the overhead of storing and maintaining the data, there will be more and more tenants, including the corporations and individuals prefer to store their files on a remote cloud data center. Investigation shows that 82% organizations benefit by embracing the cloud storage service. 11 Although the cloud storage service has plenty of attractive advantages, it is unavoidably subjected to some novel security issues and challenges. 12 In the cloud storage service, the data owners might lose the direct control over their outsourced files, which prevents them from performing operations over their outsourced data directly. 13 Therefore, all the operations over the outsourced data, such as moving the data from one cloud server to another and removing the outsourced file from the storage medium, will be executed by the remote cloud server. As a result, the outsourced data transfer and deletion have become two new problems because the selfish cloud server might not execute these operations sincerely for economic benefits. In order to permanently remove the outsourced data, a lot of researchers have focused on the problem of data deletion in the past decade and have put forward plenty of methods, such as deletion by overwriting [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] and deletion by cryptography. [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] Although a number of deletion schemes have been proposed, there are still some problems and challenges in deleting the outsourced data.
First of all, plenty of the existing data deletion schemes are inefficient, especially the schemes that realize data deletion by overwriting the disk. In the overwriting methods, when the data owners require the cloud server to delete the data, the remote cloud server will realize data deletion by utilizing random data to overwrite the physical medium and then return a deletion result. To make the data deletion operation more secure, some researchers argue that the disk should be overwritten more than one time. However, deletion by overwriting is inefficient in practical applications, especially in the distributed storage system because it needs to overwrite all the storage mediums that store the data backups. Besides, Gutmann 25 stated that it cannot really realize data deletion by overwriting the physical medium simply because there is some physical remanence left on the disk. The attacker can use the physical remanence to recover the deleted files. Hence, it is very significant to improve the efficiency and security of data deletion schemes.
Secondly, most of the existing data deletion methods cannot achieve public verification of the deletion results. Plenty of deletion schemes can be described as ''one-bit-return'' scheme: the data owners send an order to require the storage medium to delete the data. After receiving the deletion command, the storage system removes the corresponding data and then sends a onebit result (Success/Failure) to the data owners to indicate the status of the deletion operation. In these schemes, the data owners must believe the returned data deletion result because they cannot verify it conveniently and efficiently. However, the storage system might reserve the data backups maliciously for economic interests and send a false result to cheat the data owners. Later, some schemes aim to offer the data owners the capacity to verify the data deletion outcome, but many of them need a trusted third party (TTP). Take Hao et al.'s 26 data deletion scheme as an example, it needs a trusted platform module (TPM). Nevertheless, it is very hard to find such a TTP in practical applications. Therefore, the requirement of public verifiability should be reached in the data deletion schemes without requiring a TTP.
Finally, moving the cloud data among different cloud servers and deleting the transferred data from the original cloud server have become two fundamental requirements for the data owners. Data transfer is frequent in plenty of real-applicitaions, for example, smart homes, power control system, and medical datamanagement system. The report shows that cloud data traffic will increase by 19.3 exabytes per year. 27 By 2018, 9% of the total cloud traffic is predicted to be the data traffic among different clouds; there is a 2% increase compared with the end of 2013. However, only a few existing schemes can realize outsourced data transfer and deletion simultaneously. [28] [29] [30] In addition, all of them need a third party auditor. Take Ni et al.'s 28 scheme as an example, it uses the improved BCP encryption scheme and the polynomial-based authenticators to ensure the integrity of transferred data on the new cloud. Finally, it utilizes proxy-encryption technique to achieve deletion of the transferred data from the original cloud server. However, it needs a third party auditor, which will become the bottleneck. As far as we know, it seems that there is no research work on efficient and publicly verifiable outsourced data transfer and deletion scheme that does not require a TTP under the dishonest cloud server model. As a consequence, we design a vector commitment-based construction that aims to make the outsourced data transfer and deletion processes publicly verifiable. In addition, the presented construction does not require any TTP.
Main contributions
In this article, we design a new vector commitmentbased scheme that not only can achieve publicly verifiable cloud data deletion but also can realize provable data transfer between two different cloud servers. In our scheme, we use the primitive of vector commitment to generate some corresponding proofs that can be used to verify the data transfer and deletion results. Therefore, our article's main contributions are the following two folds:
We put forward a new vector commitment-based scheme that not only can achieve publicly verifiable cloud data deletion but also can realize provable data transfer between two different cloud servers. If the selfish original cloud server does not honestly transfer the data to the target cloud server, or it does not delete the transferred data sincerely, the proposed scheme can offer the data owner the ability to discover the dishonest operations by verifying the returned evidences. We apply the vector commitment (VC) to reach the property of public verifiability in the outsourced data transfer and deletion. By utilizing the tremendous advantages of VC, our proposed scheme can achieve public verifiability without requiring any TTP, which is very different from most of the previous solutions. Besides, our novel scheme is also quite efficient in communication as well as computation.
This work is the extension of our previous paper, which was presented at the International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS) 2018. 31 In the following, we describe the main differences between this article and the conference version. Firstly, we describe the related work more detailed in section ''Introduction.'' Secondly, we present a more detailed scheme and add the high description of our scheme in section ''Our construction.'' We also describe the design goals for our scheme in section ''Design goals'' and prove that our proposed scheme can satisfy these security properties in section ''Security analysis.'' Finally, we add the experimental simulation of our novel scheme and the overhead comparison between a previous scheme and our scheme in section ''Performance evaluation.''
Related work
In cloud storage, plenty of researchers have focused on the verifiable cloud data transfer and deletion for a long time, resulting in a large number of solutions. In processing the problem of data deletion, although unlinking can delete the link of the file efficiently, the contents of outsourced file still remain in the storage medium. The attacker can recover the contents by using tools to scan the disk. 32 Therefore, it is particularly meaningful to study and put forward more secure outsourced data deletion schemes.
In 2010, in order to delete the contents of the file and provide the data owner with the ability to verify the deletion result, Paul and Saxena 33 put forward a verifiable data deletion protocol that is named ''Proof of Erasability'' (PoE). In addition, Perito and Tsudik 34 put forward a similar solution called ''Proofs of Secure Erasure'' (PoSE-s), which aims to permanently delete digital data from the embedded devices. In 2011, Wei et al. 35 proposed a scheme to erase the data from flashbased solid-state drives reliably. Luo et al. 36 put forward a permutation-based verifiable cloud data erasure protocol in 2016. In their protocol, they assume that the cloud server is self-serving, and it merely maintains the latest version of the outsourced data. Besides, all the backups are assumed to be consistent when the data owner updates the data. Therefore, they turn overwriting operation into data update operation. That is, they can delete the data by updating them. Finally, the data owner is able to use a challenge-response protocol to verify the deletion outcome.
In order to permanently and efficiently delete the file from the Yet Another Flash File System (YAFFS), Lee et al. 37 put forward a secure data deletion protocol in 2010. In their scheme, they modify the YAFFS to encrypt different files with different encryption keys, and then they store the keys in the file header. Finally, they realize data deletion by deleting the file header to make the ciphertext unavailable. In 2012, Reardon et al. 38 proposed a data node encrypted file system, which can also be used to remove data from flash memory. They use a unique key to encrypt every data block and store the corresponding keys in a key storage area. They delete the related keys if the data owner wants to remove some data blocks. To be specific, the key storage area will be replaced with a new one, which does not contain the decryption keys for the deleted data blocks. In 2014, Xiong et al. 39 presented a data selfdestructing protocol. In their scheme, each file is labeled with a time instant. Besides, every privacy key will also be associated with a time interval. If the attributes that are related to the corresponding ciphertext satisfy the access structure, and the time instant must be in the specified time interval, the ciphertext can be decrypted. Upon reaching the expired time, the sensitive information will be self-destructed securely.
In order to manage the cloud data more transparently and efficiently, Du et al. 40 studied the Merkle hash tree, pre-deleting sequence, and some other basic cryptography techniques and designed a deletion scheme for multi-copy in cloud storage. Their scheme offers data owner the ability to check the deletion result by verifying the deletion evidence. In 2018, Yang et al. 41 put forward a novel outsourced data deletion scheme with public verifiability, which is based on blockchain. In their scheme, the remote cloud server stores and maintains the outsourced data. Upon receiving a valid deletion command, the remote cloud server may remove the related outsourced data and generates the corresponding deletion evidence at the same time. Finally, the deletion proof is published on the blockchain, and any verifier can check the deletion result by verifying the deletion proof without requiring any TTP. Yang and Tao 42 put forward a new cloud data deletion scheme with publicly verifiability and efficient tracking. They use the Merkle hash tree to deal with the problem of public verification and offer the data owner the ability to verify the deletion result.
Furthermore, how to achieve provable cloud data transfer and deletion simultaneously has caught plenty of researchers' attentions. In 2015, Yu et al. 27 presented a verifiable cloud data possession protocol that is characterized by provable data transfer and deletion. After the data are transferred to a new cloud server, they are able to check the transferred data integrity on the new cloud server and then delete the transferred data from the original cloud server. In 2017, Xue et al. 29 designed a verifiable cloud data transfer scheme from provable data possession (PDP) and cloud data deletion. In their scheme, when the data owners want to alter the service provider, they can move the data blocks to a new cloud server and check the transferred data integrity on the new cloud server. Moreover, the original cloud removes the corresponding transferred data blocks and utilizes rank-based Merkle Hash Tree (RMHT) to generate a deletion proof. Then the data owners can check the deletion result by verifying the proof. Later, Wang et al. 11 presented a verifiable cloud data transfer and erasure protocol. Their scheme could provide the data owner the ability to transfer data between two different cloud servers. Besides, they use homomorphic authenticators and homomorphic encryption to offer the data owner the ability to verify the deletion result on the original cloud and the transferred data integrity on the new cloud.
Organization
In the following section, we will describe the organization for the rest of the article. We present some preliminaries in section ''Preliminaries,'' including the bilinear pairings and the VC. In section ''Problem statement,'' we will minutely describe the problem statement. Then, in section ''Our construction,'' we describe our novel scheme in detail. In section ''Analysis of our scheme,'' we first give a brief security analysis of our scheme. After that, we make a comparison between our novel scheme and an existing scheme. Finally, we give a conclusion about the proposed data transfer and deletion scheme in section ''Conclusion.''
Preliminaries
In the following section, we firstly present the basic definitions and main properties of the bilinear pairings briefly. Secondly, we may give a short description about the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Finally, we describe the cryptographic primitive of VC, which is particularly important for realizing public verifiability.
Bilinear pairings
We assume that the groups G 1 and G 2 are two cyclic multiplicative groups. p is a prime that is the order of groups G 1 and G 2 . Then we let g be an arbitrary generator of G 1 . A bilinear pairing is a map e : G 1 3 G 1 ! G 2 with three properties:
Computable: for all U , V 2 G 1 , there is always an algorithm to efficiently calculate the value of e(P, Q).
The CDH problem in G 1 is defined as follows: Definition 1. We assume that a and b are both randomly chosen from Z p . For any a, b 2 Z p , on input a triple (g, g a , g b ), and subsequently outputs a value g ab , where g is a generator of G 1 . If for each probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A, there is always a negligible function negl (Á) which Pr½A(1 a , g, g a , g b ) = g ab ł negl(k), the CDH assumption holds, where k is the discretionary security parameter.
Vector commitment
As a fundamental cryptographic primitive, commitment scheme plays a really important role in plenty of security protocols, for instance, zero-knowledge proof, identification protocol, digital voting scheme, and verifiable database. 43 Informally, a commitment protocol could intuitively be seen as a sealed envelope: when the sender wants to commit to a message m, he can put the message m into the envelope and send the sealed envelope to the receiver. At a later moment, the sender is able to open the sealed envelope to publicly show the committed message m. A commitment scheme is expected to satisfy two properties. The first one is called ''hiding,'' which means that nobody but the sender is able to open the envelope to disclose the committed message m from the commitment. The other one is called ''binding,'' which means that upon committing to a message m, the commitment mechanism does not allow the sender to change m anymore. 44 In 2013, Catalano and Fiore 45 put forward a new cryptographic primitive from commitment, which is called vector commitment (VC). Generally speaking, a VC scheme is very closely related to the zero-knowledge sets. Without loss of generality, a VC scheme can allow the committer to commit to an ordered sequence of messages (m 1 , . . . , m q ) in a particular way: the committer can open the commitment to reveal the messages at specific positions. 46 Furthermore, a VC protocol can satisfy the property of ''posititon binding,'' which means that nobody is able to open the commitment to reveal two different messages at a same position. Moreover, a VC scheme can also satisfy the property of hiding. That is, for any given commitment, no one but the committer can distinguish whether the given commitment is created to m or m 0 . Although have obtained some openings at the corresponding positions, the adversary still cannot distinguish whether the commitment is created to m or m 0 . However, Catalano and Fiore do not consider the property of hiding because it is not a critical property in some applications. Last but not least, a VC scheme is also required to be concise, which means that the opening and the size of the commitment both are independent of q.
VC:KeyGen(1 k , q): on input k and q = poly(k), the key generation algorithm outputs some public parameters pp, where k is the security parameter and q defines the size of the committed vector. Besides, pp can also implicitly define the message space M. VC:Com pp (m 1 , . . . , m q ): the committing algorithm takes as inputs pp and (m 1 , . . . , m q ) 2 M q and then, outputs auxiliary information aux and commitment p. VC:Open pp (m, i, aux): the opening algorithm is executed by the committer and finally outputs an evidence l i to prove m is the i-th committed message. VC:Ver pp (p, m, i, l i ): if and only if l i is valid and commitment p is created to (m 1 , . . . , m q ) such that m = m i will this algorithm return 1. VC:Update pp (p, m, i, m 0 ): this algorithm is executed by the original committer, who wants to obtain a new commitment by changing m to m 0 at position i. This update algorithm takes as inputs m and m 0 and then outputs p 0 and U. VC:ProofUpdate pp (p, U , m 0 , i, l j ): every user who owns l j can run this algorithm, where l j is an evidence for the message at the position j related to p when the i-th message is updated to m 0 . On input p, l j , U , and m 0 , then returns a novel evidence l 0 j and an updated VC p 0 .
Problem statement
In the following section, we firstly describe the system model of our proposed scheme. Then we formalize the main security threats, which are considered in our scheme. Finally, we identify our principal design goals in detail.
System model
In the following section, we present the system model of our new proposed scheme. Without loss of generality, the system model contains two remote cloud servers S 1 and S 2 , and a data owner O, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
A data owner O refers to an entity that owns restricted computing resources, network resources, and storage resources. In order to save the local storage overhead, O prefers to outsource his personal data to the remote cloud server S 1 . Later, as some controllable or uncontrollable factors, O may transfer the outsourced data to a new cloud server S 2 . Whereafter, O is willing to permanently delete the transferred data from S 1 and verifies the transfer and deletion results by checking the returned evidences. An original cloud server S 1 is an entity who has powerful computing ability, plenty of storage resources, and transmission bandwidths. In our system model, we assume that S 1 might transfer the specified data to cloud server S 2 . After that, S 1 is requested to permanently remove the transferred data. Finally, S 1 computes some corresponding proofs to convince O that the data transfer and deletion operations have been executed honestly. A target cloud server S 2 refers to another entity which also owns a number of storage spaces and provides on-demand cloud storage service for the resource-constraint data owners. In our scheme, we define that S 2 is the target cloud server. That is to say, S 2 receives the transferred data from S 1 and stores them. After that, S 2 generates a new commitment and returns evidence to O to indicate the success of the data transfer.
Security threats
In our scheme, we will assume that S 1 is a ''semi-honest-but-curious'' cloud server and it may not follow our protocol honestly for financial incentives. Besides, some malicious users (hackers) might try to unlawfully access the outsourced data. Therefore, there are two types of attacks should be considered in our scheme: the external attacks and the internal attacks. The external attackers, such as hackers and malicious users, might pay attention to digging the sensitive information from the outsourced data. The internal attackers, such as the dishonest administrators of the cloud storage system, may study the privacy of O from the outsourced data. Besides, S 1 may not transfer the data or delete the transferred data sincerely for economic benefits. More specifically, we mainly consider the following four security challenges: Data privacy exposure: data privacy exposure is a very common security threat for the data owner in the cloud storage service for the following three reasons. Firstly, the attackers are so curious that they might try their best to illegally access the outsourced data for digging some private information. Secondly, the remote cloud server might share the outsourced data with their corporators for financial incentives. Last but not least, the cloud server would reserve some copies maliciously to dig some implicit benefits from the data. Therefore, the outsourced data suffer from privacy exposure threat. Data pollution: the outsourced data may be polluted as the following factors. Firstly, the selfish remote cloud server might delete some outsourced data that are rarely accessed to save storage resources. Secondly, for saving the transmission bandwidth, S 1 may merely send part of the data when O downloads or transfers the data. Finally, the external attackers may destroy the data maliciously. Hence, the outsourced data suffer from data pollution. Dishonest data transfer: in practical applications, the local data owner may transfer the data from S 1 to S 2 for some objective or subjective reasons. To transfer the data successfully, S 1 needs to cost some computation and communication resources. For some economic reasons, S 1 may only transfer partial data to S 2 , or even worse, S 1 may not transfer the data at all. However, S 1 will claim that the data have been transferred to S 2 honestly and return an error transfer result to mislead O. Therefore, dishonest data transfer is another security threat. Malicious data reservation: when the data have been transferred to S 2 , O prefers to permanently delete the transferred file from S 1 . However, the selfish S 1 might maliciously keep some backups of transferred data for the following reasons. Firstly, S 1 needs to expend some additional overhead to delete the transferred data. Secondly, S 1 can obtain some implicit benefits from the data reservation arbitrarily, which may lead to data privacy exposure. Therefore, from O's point of view, the malicious transferred data reservation is also a security threat.
Moreover, we can assume that S 1 and S 2 will not collude together to cheat O because they belong to different enterprises. That is, the two cloud servers both follow our protocol independently. Furthermore, we assume that S 2 would not slander S 1 maliciously for good reputation and S 1 will not store any data backups on other subcontractors.
Design goals
In our new scheme, we aim to reach provable data transfer and verifiable data deletion in cloud storage. As a result, according to the above security threats, we need to realize the following four properties:
Data confidentiality: in order to protect the sensitive data contained in the outsourced file, it must prevent the attackers from accessing the sensitive data illegally. This implies that we need to use secure encryption algorithm to encrypt the outsourced file and then outsource the corresponding ciphertext. In addition, the decryption key should be maintained so secret that only the data owner knows. Data integrity: in order to prevent the outsourced data from being polluted, on one hand, O should be given the ability to verify data integrity during the data decryption process; on the other hand, S 2 should check that whether the transferred data blocks are intact before storing them. If the data are not intact, both O and S 2 can detect the data pollution. Verifiability: in order to ensure that the outsourced data have been successfully transferred to S 2 and have been deleted from S 1 permanently, O and S 2 should have the ability to check the results of the data transfer and deletion operations. If S 1 does not faithfully transfer or delete the transferred data, it cannot forge effective evidences to prove that the file has been transferred or deleted honestly. Accountability: Upon performing some operations over the outsourced data, both O and S 1 cannot deny their behaviors. If one of them denies his performance and slanders the other, the one who is vilified can prove his innocence and disclose the slanderer's malicious behavior.
Our construction

Overview
In this article, we adopt the primitive of VC to construct a new scheme that aims to solve the problem of verifiable outsourced data transfer and deletion under a commercial model.
The main processes of our new proposed scheme are demonstrated in Figure 2 . The outsourced file always contains some sensitive information which should be kept secret from the data owner's point of view. Therefore, the data owner O should first encrypt the file to protect the data confidentiality and then outsource the ciphertext to the original cloud server S 1 . The original cloud server S 1 maintains the data and returns a storage proof. After that, the data owner O can check the storage result and delete the local backups. Later, when the data owner O needs the outsourced file, he must download the ciphertext from the original cloud server S 1 and decrypt it to obtain the related plaintext. Meanwhile, due to some controllable or uncontrollable factors, the data owner O may want to change the cloud storage service provider. Therefore, the data owner O needs to transfer the data from the original cloud server S 1 to the target cloud server S 2 and checks the data transfer result. Finally, the data owner O wants to delete the transferred data from the original cloud server S 1 . The original cloud server S 1 executes data deletion command and returns a data deletion evidence, which will be used to verify the data deletion result by the data owner O.
We can easily find that our new proposed scheme can achieve data confidentiality, provable data transfer, and verifiable data deletion, which is very similar to the previous solutions. 29, 47 Moreover, our new construction is able to achieve public verifiability without requiring any TTP. However, the previous schemes 29, 47, 48 need to introduce a third party auditor. In real-applications, the third party auditor has become the bottleneck that impedes the rapid development of verifiable data transfer and deletion. Therefore, we can think that our new proposed solution is more attractive and practical.
The concrete construction
In this subsection, we may introduce our novel provable outsourced data transfer and deletion scheme in detail. In the following, we firstly describe some symbols that will be utilized in our novel scheme. First of all, we could assume that O has passed the identification and become a legal client of the two cloud storage service providers S 1 and S 2 . After that, O can set a secret and unique identity number id o . Besides, we use symbols H 1 ( Á ) and H 2 ( Á ) to represent two secure oneway collision resistant hash functions. Furthermore, every file is named with a unique name in our scheme, and the file's name is kept secret by O. Without loss of generality, O is assumed to outsource a file F, and its name is n f .
KeyGen. First of all, it is required to generate ECDSA public/private key pairs (pk o , sk o ), (pk s 1 , sk s 1 ), and (pk s 2 , sk s 2 ) for the data owner O, the original cloud server S 1 , and the target cloud server S 2 , respectively. Then O runs the algorithm VC:KeyGen(1 k , q) to obtain public parameters pp = (g, fh i g i2½q , fhg i, j2½q, i6 ¼j ), where VC is a vector commitment scheme which is based on the CDH assumption.
Encrypt. In order to prevent the sensitive information from disclosure, the data owner O needs to encrypt the outsourced data. 
. . , C q ) and runs the algorithm VC:Com pp (C 1 , . . . , C q ) to generate a commitment p. On receipt of C, S 1 may store the data block C i at position i.
StoreCheck. After uploading the outsourced data to S 1 , O wants to check that whether S 1 stores the data blocks honestly. Firstly, for all i 2 ½1, q, S 1 executes the algorithm l i VC:Open pp (C i , i, aux) to generate the storage evidences l = (l 1 , . . . , l q ) and sends l to O. Upon receiving l, O runs the algorithm x i VC: Ver pp (p, C i , i, l i ) and then checks all x i . If there exists an i to make x i = 0 hold, O quits and outputs failure; otherwise, O trusts that S 1 honestly stores the data blocks and deletes the local data backups.
Decryption. When O requires the outsourced file, he must obtain the corresponding ciphertext from S 1 and execute decryption operation to obtain related plaintext. Therefore, there will be two processes in the sig t = Sign sk o (transferjjtagjjT t jjC), where T t is a timestamp. After that, O generates a data transfer request R t = (transfer, sig t , tag, T t , C) and sends R t to S 1 . At the same time, O will send the commitment p to S 2 . 2. Migrate: upon receipt of the data transfer request R t , S 1 will check the validity of R t . If R t is not valid, S 1 quits and outputs failure; otherwise, S 1 computes a signature sig ts = Sign sk s 1 (transferjjR t ). Then S 1 sends the data blocks fC i g i2C to S 2 , along with the proofs fl i g i2C and the signature sig ts . 3. TranCheck: upon receiving sig ts and fC i , l i g i2C , S 2 firstly verifies the validity of sig ts . If sig ts is not valid, S 2 quits and outputs failure; otherwise, for all i 2 C, S 2 executes the algorithm x i VC:Ver pp (p, C i , i, l i ), and then checks all x i . If there exists an i 2 C to make x i = 0 hold, S 2 quits and outputs failure; otherwise, S 2 creates q empty units (b 1 , . . . , b q ). Then for all i 2 C, S 2 stores C i at position b i . Besides, the other units fb i g i2½1, q, i6 2C will be set NULL. After that, S 2 runs the algorithm VC:Com pp (b 1 , . . . , b q ) to compute a new commitment p s 2 and sets the auxiliary information aux s 2 = (b 1 , . . . , b q ). Finally, S 2 sends p s 2 and sig ts to O.
Deletion. O prefers to permanently delete the transferred data blocks from S 1 after migration, and only store the transferred data on S 2 finally. 
Analysis of our scheme
In the following section, we will provide a detailed analysis about our new proposed scheme. First of all, we might prove the security properties that our new scheme can satisfy. Secondly, we give a comparison between Hao et al.'s scheme 26 
Security analysis
In the following, we will prove that our proposed scheme can satisfy the desired security properties.
Data confidentiality. Data confidentiality means that the attacker cannot obtain any plaintext information of the outsourced data if they cannot obtain the corresponding data decryption key. In our proposed scheme, the local data owner uses the IND-CPA secure Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt the outsourced data and maintains the encryption/decryption keys secretly, which can ensure that any attacker cannot get the data encryption/decryption keys illegally. That is, any attacker cannot maliciously obtain the plaintext. Therefore, the proposed scheme can satisfy the outsourced data confidentiality.
Data integrity. Without loss of generality, our proposed provable cloud data transfer and deletion scheme is able to guarantee the cloud data integrity.
After outsourcing the personal data to the original cloud server S 1 , the local data owner O would delete the corresponding data copies from local storage medium. Therefore, in the Decryption phase, O must download the related ciphertext C i = (cip i , h i , i) from S 1 and execute decryption operation to obtain the corresponding plaintext m i . On receipt of the ciphertext C i , O can check the data integrity of C i . First of all, O checks that whether the equation h i = ? H 2 (cip i jjtagjjsk o jji) holds. Note that sk o is O's privacy key; hence, nobody can forge a new ciphertext cip 0 i and a hash value h 0 i to make the equation h 0 i = H 2 (cip 0 i jjtagjjsk o jji) hold. In other words, if and only if C i is intact, can the verification pass and O is able to get the correct plaintext after running the Decryption algorithm; otherwise, O is always able to discover the data pollution if the data are tampered maliciously.
In the Transfer process, the original cloud server S 1 transfers (sig ts , fC i , l i g i2C ) to the target cloud server S 2 . First of all, the VC scheme is able to achieve position binding and hiding. Hence, for a same position i, S 1 cannot open the message C i to another message C 0 i . That is, the proofs fl i g i2C must be valid; otherwise, the dishonest action will be discovered by S 2 . Secondly, S 2 executes the algorithm x i VC:Ver pp (p, C i , i, l i ), where i 2 C. After that, S 2 verifies all x i . If and only if the data blocks fC i g i2C are integrated and the proofs fl i g i2C are valid will all the verifications pass; otherwise, S 2 is able to discover the malicious data manipulation.
Therefore, we can say that our new proposed scheme is able to guarantee the outsourced data integrity in the data transfer and decryption phases.
Public verifiability. Our proposed scheme is able to satisfy the property of public verifiability. After deleting the transferred data from the storage medium, the remote original cloud S 1 may compute a deletion evidence t, where t = (R e , p 0 , fi, sig ei g i2C , C). After that, any verifier that acquires the evidence t can efficiently check the result of the outsourced data deletion operation by verifying the evidence. First of all, the verifier is able to check the validity of the data deletion request R e = (erasure, sig e , tag, T e , C) through signature verification. If the verification passes, it can prove that O had asked S 1 to delete the transferred data. After that, the verifier checks the validity of the signatures sig ei that are generated by S 1 with private key sk s 1 , where i 2 C. If every signature can pass the verification, the verifier further checks that whether the equation
holds. If and only if each verification passes, the verifier will believe that the data blocks have been deleted by S 1 faithfully. In addition, we can realize that all the verification phases do not require any private information. As a result, any verifier can use evidence t to verify the deletion result. Hence, our presented scheme can achieve public verifiability.
Accountable traceability. Our novel proposed scheme can satisfy the property of accountable traceability. More specifically, we analyze the accountable traceability in the data transfer and data deletion processes, respectively.
In data transfer process. Our new scheme can achieve provable data transfer between two different cloud servers. We will mainly consider the following scenarios: the dishonest O and the malicious S 1 . that is computed by S 1 with private key sk s 1 . The private key sk s 1 is only owned by S 1 ; therefore, nobody can forge the signature sig ts . That is, the signature sig ts can be seen as an evidence, which is able to prove that O had requested S 1 to transfer the data and S 1 has responded to the request.
In data deletion process. Similarly, we describe the accountable traceability when O and S 1 behave maliciously during the data deletion process. 
Comparison
In order to demonstrate the overhead and efficiency more intuitively, we compare our novel VC-based scheme with the existing Hao et al.'s scheme 26 in the following section. Without loss of generality, both the two schemes need to execute a few one-time computations to prepare the corresponding keys. Secondly, our proposed scheme is able to achieve public verifiability without requiring any TTP; however, Hao et al.'s scheme 26 needs a TPM. Moreover, our proposed scheme is able to reach provable outsourced data transfer and deletion, which is different from Hao et al.'s scheme. 26 Finally, the remote cloud server might maintain the outsourced data. That is to say, the remote cloud server will execute most of the computation operations (this is the same in Hao et al.'s scheme 26 ).
In our novel scheme, the outsourced file F is assumed to be divided into q blocks before encrypting, and then m blocks are downloaded in the Decryption process. To compare the overhead more conveniently, we will introduce some symbols. Firstly, E represents an operation of IND-CPA secure AES encryption, and D represents a performance of AES decryption (particularly, we can also use other secure encryption/decryption algorithms). In addition, we use S to indicate an ECDSA signature generation calculation, respectively, and V indicates an ECDSA signature verification operation. Furthermore, we define E as an exponentiation computation in G 1 or G 2 , M as a multiplication calculation in G 1 (or G 2 ), and H as a hash computation. Finally, we assume that the data owner wants to transfer l data blocks to the target cloud server, and after that delete these data blocks from the original cloud server.
From Tables 1 and 2 , it can be easily discovered that our scheme can simultaneously achieve verifiable outsourced data transfer and deletion without relying on any TTP, which is different from scheme. 26 Moreover, our novel scheme will cost much less overhead to encrypt and decrypt the same size of the file. In order to delete l data blocks, our new scheme needs to execute (l + 1) ECDSA signature generation calculations and (l + 1) ECDSA signature verification computations, and (q + l) exponentiation operations. However, Hao et al.'s scheme 26 merely needs to perform one signature generation computation and one signature verification performance to delete a file. Hao et al.'s scheme 26 costs fewer computations to delete the data; however, the extra computations in our scheme are fully acceptable. In addition, the data deletion operation is one-time. As a result, our new scheme is still relatively efficient.
Performance evaluation
In the following, we will provide the performance evaluation of our proposed verifiable cloud data transfer More specifically, we execute the simulation experiments on the same Linux machine equipped with 4GB main memory and Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 processors running at 3.30 GHz, and we simulate all the entities on this Linux machine. Finally, we are able to evaluate the overhead of the proposed scheme precisely throughout the simulations. In order to protect the outsourced data confidentiality, the local data owner should use encryption algorithm to encrypt the outsourced file before outsourcing it to the remote cloud server. The encryption operation efficiency comparison of our novel scheme and Hao et al.'s scheme is presented in Figure 3 . From the comparison of the simulation results, we can find that the overhead of the encryption operation will increase with the size of the encrypted file. To encrypt the same size of plaintext, Hao et al.'s scheme requires much more time than our scheme. Furthermore, our novel scheme's growth rate is much lower than that of Hao et al.'s scheme. Therefore, we can say that our novel scheme is much more efficient in encryption phase.
After outsourcing the personal data to the remote cloud server, our scheme gives the local data owner the ability to verify the storage result. The main computation comes from generating storage proofs and verifying the storage proofs. To be more specific, the remote cloud server needs to perform q(q À 1) exponentiation calculations and q(q À 2) multiplication computations to generate related storage proofs for the data owner. Then the data owner needs to execute 2q pairing computations and q exponentiation calculations to verify the storage result. From Figure 4 , we are able to find that the time cost will increase with the number of the data blocks, and the growth rate is quite high. However, the remote cloud server will bear most of these computational overhead. Furthermore, the remote cloud server can generate the storage proofs off-line. That is, our novel scheme is still quite efficient in practical applications.
The local data owner will not maintain any data copy after outsourcing the file to the remote cloud server. Therefore, when the data owner requires the outsourced data, they need to download the ciphertext from the remote cloud server, and then they can obtain the file by decrypting the ciphertext. To perform the experiment conveniently, we can assume that the data owner stores 100 data blocks on the cloud server and downloads 20 data blocks in the decryption phase. Then the decryption efficiency comparison of our proposed scheme and Hao et al.'s scheme is shown in Figure 5 . From Figure 5 , we can realize that our proposed scheme costs much less overhead to decrypt the same size of decrypted ciphertext. Furthermore, the time cost will increase with the size of the decrypted file, nevertheless, the growth rate of Hao et al.'s scheme is much higher than that of our new proposed scheme. As a result, our new proposed scheme is much more efficient to decrypt the file.
Both our novel scheme and Hao et al. scheme can satisfy the public verifiability of the data deletion result. To delete a file, Hao et al.'s scheme needs to execute one signature generation operation and a signature verification operation. However, in order to delete l data blocks, our novel scheme should compute (l + 1) ECDSA signatures and check the validity of these signatures. In addition, our scheme still needs to perform (q + l) exponentiation operations (here we assume q = 100). The Figure 6 shows the efficiency comparison between the two schemes in data deletion process.
Then we can find that Hao et al.'s scheme costs less time. Besides, the overhead of our scheme will increase with the number of deleted data blocks. Luckily, the data deletion operation is one-time, and the overhead is absolutely acceptable because the time is very short. For example, it only takes about 11 ms to delete 16 data blocks. Hence, we can say that our proposed scheme is still efficient in data deletion.
Conclusion
Due to the lack of trust between the local data owner O and the remote original cloud server S 1 , O will think that S 1 might not honestly transfer the file to the target cloud server S 2 or delete the transferred data for economic interests. To deal with this trust issue, we design a novel verifiable outsourced data transfer and deletion scheme for cloud storage, which is based on VC. The proposed scheme is able to simultaneously achieve provable outsourced data transfer and verifiable transferred data deletion from S 1 . If S 1 does not honestly execute the outsourced data transfer and deletion operations, our proposed scheme can enable O to discover S 1 's dishonest operations by checking the returned evidences. In addition, we utilize the VC to deal with the issue of public verifiability, by which the verifier can verify the results of the transfer and deletion operations without requiring any TTP. Figure 5 . The time cost of decrypting. Figure 6 . The time cost of deleting.
